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Abstract: 
Existing theoretical models of house prices and credit rely on continuous rationality of 
consumers, an assumption that has been frequently questioned in recent years. Meanwhile, 
empirical investigations of the relationship between prices and credit are often based on 
national-level data, which is then tested for structural breaks and asymmetric responses, 
usually with subsamples. Meen (1999) argues that local markets are structurally different 
from one another and so the coefficients of any estimated housing market model should vary 
from region to region. We investigate differences in the price-credit relationship for 12 
regions of the UK. Markov-switching is introduced to capture asymmetric market behaviours 
and turning points. Results show that credit abundance had a large impact on house prices in 
Greater London and nearby regions alongside a strong positive feedback effect from past 
house price movements. This impact is even larger in Greater London and the South East of 
England when house prices are falling, which are the only instances where the credit effect is 
more prominent than the positive feedback effect. A strong positive feedback effect from past 
lending activity is also present in the loan dynamics. Furthermore, bubble probabilities 
extracted using a discrete Kalman filter neatly capture market turning points. 
Key words: regional house prices, housing credit, Markov-switching, asymmetric responses, 
turning points 
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1. Introduction 
A generally accepted view is that irresponsible lending was the prime culprit behind the steep 
ascent of house prices and the ensuing 2007-8 financial crisis that affected the US and many 
other developed economies. Excessive and poorly allocated credit also holds a prominent 
place in explanations of numerous other financial and economic crises that the world has 
suffered over the previous century (BIS, 2001, Wong, 2001, Gerlach and Peng, 2004, Borio 
and Lowe, 2002, IMF, 2000, Herring and Wachter, 2002, Herring and Wachter, 1999, Drees 
and Pazarbaşioğlu, 1998). Alternative perspectives on explanatory factors are far less 
prominent, except in rare cases  (see (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2008, Kahn, 2009)). Therefore, 
studying the impact of lending on asset prices and house prices, in particular, is an important 
exercise, but the exploration of other plausible explanations also matters for enriching our 
understanding of recurrent financial crises. This is an area in which the current study hopes to 
contribute.  
The United Kingdom (UK) has experienced phenomenal growth in housing wealth in recent 
decades, from £364.7 billion at the beginning of 1983 to over £4 trillion at the end of 2007 
(Oxford Economics (OE) data). This is a tenfold increase over a period when retail prices 
rose by only 153 per centi and the physical dwelling stock expanded by less than 25 per cent.ii 
These numbers imply that increases in house prices are the primary contributor to the rise in 
this country’s housing wealth, a view supported by published house price indices such as the 
Halifax Price Index, which rose by 558 per cent over the same period, equating to 7.12% per 
annum. This makes the UK an interesting case study for testing the role of credit in driving 
price increases and the possible presence of housing bubbles. Empirical study of the UK is 
facilitated by the accessibility of good quality house price and mortgage lending data. 
House prices in the UK have received a great deal of attention in recent decades from policy-
makers and economic commentators. A major reason for this attention derives from the belief 
that rising house prices drive consumption upwards.iii It is now recognised that increasing 
house prices have a significant wealth effect on consumption and the major models of the UK 
economy now incorporate housing wealth alongside financial wealth in their consumption 
functions.  
The wealth effect of housing refers to the fact that households, who attempt to smooth 
consumption over the life cycle, will spend and borrow more when the value of their housing 
asset increases. It is often claimed that house price appreciation can redistribute wealth but 
not increase it in aggregate, and that the wealth effect on consumption and investment is 
ambiguous a priori. A permanent increase in house prices will have a positive wealth effect 
on landlords and home-owners; it will nevertheless have a negative income effect on tenants 
and prospective first-time buyers (Aoki et al., 2004, Goodhart and Hofmann, 2008). This 
view is valid when the majority of transactions take place among the regular residents of an 
economy. However, in an open economy such as the UK, where foreign buyers constitute a 
major driver of certain housing markets (e.g. Central London) in recent years, redistribution 
can occur in a rising market from foreigners to the regular residents.  
Besides a wealth effect, scholars also recognize the importance of a collateral effect. Higher 
house prices increase housing demand from borrowing-constrained households, leading to 
credit expansion by financial institutions. A rise in credit supply may, in turn, have 
repercussions on house prices because it lowers the lending rate and stimulates economic 
activity. As a result, prices may rise in the short-run with speculation encouraged by higher 
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expected capital gains.iv   This makes the housing market prone to substantial price swings. 
The cyclicality of house prices can thus lead to considerable variations in households’ 
collateral position over the market cycle. It has been observed that the amount of secured 
borrowing is closely related to this collateral position and that the spread of mortgage rates 
over the risk-free rate varies with the collateral position of each household (Aoki et al., 2004).  
Financial systems in industrialized countries have undergone a process of liberalization and 
deregulation since the 1970s. Goodhart et al. (2004) argue that these institutional and 
regulatory changes are likely to have increased the pro-cyclicality of financial systems by 
nurturing pro-cyclical lending practices of banks, thus strengthening the links between the 
financial sector and property prices. Goodhart and Hofmann (2008) observe that many 
industrialized countries have experienced extraordinarily strong growth in money and credit 
accompanied by strong growth in house prices in recent decades. 
The United Kingdom went through significant liberalisation of the mortgage market in the 
1980s. Between 1980 and 1986, a series of regulatory measures were removed in the UK to 
improve competition in the mortgage market. Building societies were allowed to access 
wholesale funding markets; banks were allowed to compete directly with building societies in 
the mortgage market; other non-banks such as department stores and insurance companies 
were increasingly able to offer mortgage products. These changes have resulted in increased 
competition and financial innovation that made withdrawing housing equity easier when 
house prices rise. Aoki et al. (2004) show that, prior to the mid-1980s, there was little 
relationship between housing equity and mortgage equity withdrawal. They became more 
closely linked from the late 1980s as new mortgage products made refinancing easier and 
cheaper.  
Another important development in the mortgage market is the securitisation of consumer 
credit. Lowe et al. (2012) argue that securitisation of mortgages created a new circuit of 
global capital, while national mortgage markets became the conduit through which home 
owners were connected to this wave of globally sourced capital. In the UK, equity stored in 
owner-occupied property became much more fungible because of the very liberal mortgage 
market. Doms and Krainer (2007) show that innovations in the mortgage market after 2000 
allowed mortgage lenders to lower down-payment requirements; and that coinciding with this 
and other developments in the mortgage market has been a marked increase in 
homeownership in the US. 
To date, most studies on the price-credit nexus focus on the national housing market. Studies 
of UK regional housing markets have largely centred on the existence or otherwise of a 
‘ripple effect’. The ripple effect may be described by four distinctive features:  i) regional 
differentials in house price growth are much greater than can be explained by incomes; ii) the 
regional differential in price growth is highly cyclical alongside the business cycle; iii) the 
relative house prices of different regions converges to a set of constants in the long-run; iv) 
there is an epicentre that always leads the ups and downs of regional house price gaps, and 
which is always more volatile than the rest (Holmans, 1990, Meen, 1999).  
In his quest for the ripple effect, Meen (1999) noticed that there are significant regional 
differences in the way that house price growth reacts to economic conditions. He points out 
that the housing market of a nation may be best characterised as a series of interlinked local 
markets rather than a single national market. He refers this feature as spatial dependence. 
These local markets are structurally different owing to differences in economic conditions 
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and household composition. Hence, the coefficients of any estimated housing market model 
must vary from region to region  this is referred to as coefficient heterogeneity.   
Our study makes the following contributions to the literature. As far as we are aware, this is 
the first scholarly article investigating the relationship between house prices and housing 
credit based on regional rather than national house prices. We also make some theoretical 
contributions in explaining the conundrum surrounding the role of credit in the determination 
of house prices by constructing a model based on market opportunities. Like in Aoki et al. 
(2004) and in Ortalo-Magne and Rady (2006), the crucial transmission mechanism in our 
model is credit constraint. Unlike these models, ours does not require households to be 
continuously rational. The research community has become increasingly aware that the 
assumption of rationality, a standard feature of mainstream economic models, may not hold 
for all households in all times (see (Xiao, 2010, TheGuardian, 2015) for a list of references). 
For instance, participants in housing markets are often subject to market psychology rather 
than making rational deliberations between non-housing consumption and housing 
investment. Empirically, the inclusion of  a Markov-switching state variable enables us to 
endogenize structural changes indicated by earlier literature (Goodhart and Hofmann, 2008), 
as well as asymmetrical adjustment in different phases of market cycles (Cook, 2003).  
2. Review of the literature 
Goodhart and Hofmann (2008) point out that optimal portfolio adjustment is the transmission 
mechanism between money and house prices. This mechanism also suggests a two-way 
transmission. An expansion of money reduces the marginal utility of liquid assets relative to 
the marginal utility of other assets. Agents rebalance asset portfolios in an attempt to restore 
equilibrium, resulting in increases in a broad range of asset prices (Meltzer, 1995; Nelson, 
2003). By the same token, an increase in house prices alters the relative marginal utility of 
housing assets, triggering a portfolio rebalancing which involves a higher demand for 
monetary assets (Greiber and Setzer, 2007). Goodhart and Hofmann (2008) further argue that 
there are potentially multidirectional links between money, credit, house prices and the wider 
economy, and that no definite conclusions can be drawn in the absence of a fully-fledged 
general-equilibrium theoretical model.  
There are some general equilibrium models in the theoretical literature which consider a 
subset of the variables mentioned in the preceding passage. Based on the financial accelerator 
model of Bernanke et al. (1999), Aoki et al. (2004) construct a general equilibrium model of 
house prices, housing investment and consumption. The model, based on the utility 
maximization principle, describes how credit channels amplify and propagate shocks when 
households choose between non-housing consumption and housing investment. In a similar 
vein, Ortalo-Magne and Rady (2006) propose a model of the housing market with a credit 
constraint and a property ladder leading from starter homes to trade-up homes. In their model, 
the ability of young households to afford the down payment on a starter-home is a powerful 
driver of the housing market. They highlight a channel whereby changes in income may yield 
overreaction, especially in the price of trade-up homes.  
The empirical literature has been fascinated by the often observed coincidence between house 
price growth and credit expansion. Does this coincidence reflect merely the effects of some 
common driving force, such as economic policy or the business cycle, or does it reflect a 
direct link between the two variables? If there is a direct link, does it run from house prices to 
housing credit or from housing credit to house prices, or in both directions?  
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Hoffman (2001), using a vector error correction model (VECM), found that the long-run 
development of private sector credit cannot be explained in the majority of the 16 countries 
investigated without including an index of average residential and commercial property 
prices. He further finds that, in most countries, the interaction between credit and property 
prices is bi-directional. Gerlach and Peng (2005) also adopt a VECM framework, in their 
study of Hong Kong. They found that bank lending appears to adjust to property prices in the 
long-run, not the reverse. In the short-run, property prices also drive bank lending, but 
lending does not appear to influence the short-run dynamics of prices. In the context of the 
Irish economy, Fitzpatrick and McQuinn (2007), again using VECM, found a mutually 
reinforcing long-run relationship between house prices and housing credit. In the short-run, 
they found that the contemporaneous value of credit growth has a positive and significant 
effect on house price growth; but the reverse is not true. The lagged level of credit (loan-to-
income ratio) also contributed to the rate of house price growth.  
In an attempt to assess the lead-lag relationships between money, credit, house prices and the 
macro-economy, Goodhart and Hofmann (2008) performed an analysis for a panel of 17 
industrialized countries using fixed-effects panel vector autoregression (panel VAR). Their 
sample spanned from 1973 to 2006, but they also re-estimated their model over a shorter 
period from 1985 to 2006 because of suspected structural changes. Their empirical analysis 
shows that money growth has a significant effect on house prices and credit, credit influences 
money and house prices, and house prices influence both credit and money. This 
multidirectional link is found to be stronger over 1985 to 2006 than over the full sample 
period. They attribute this to financial liberalization in industrialized countries, which was 
discussed earlier. They further found that shocks to house prices, credit and money all have 
significant repercussions on GDP, CPI and interest rates. Shocks to the latter group of macro-
economic variables in turn have significant effects on house prices, money and credit. 
Furthermore, the impact of shocks to money and credit on house prices are stronger when 
house prices are rising than otherwise.  
Davis and Zhu (2011) construct a simple model of property demand, stock adjustment and 
new construction. Credit constraint is incorporated in the demand function. Their model 
suggests that lending is closely related to property prices and property markets can develop 
cycles given plausible assumptions. Their empirical work, using VECM framework, covers 
17 industrialized countries spanning the period 1970–2003. Their results show that rising 
commercial property prices cause credit expansion in some countries and that increasing 
lending boosts commercial property prices in others. They further found that property prices 
show particularly strong links to credit in countries where banking crises were associated 
with property losses during 1985–1995. Both prices and credit are strongly influenced by 
GDP growth.  
Finally, using data from 11 OECD countries from 1920 to 2011, Bordo and Landon-Lane 
(2013) estimate a panel VAR in order to identify shocks that can be interpreted as loose 
monetary policy shocks, low inflation shocks, bank credit shocks and house price shocks. 
They show that loose monetary policy played an important role in housing booms along with 
the other shocks. They also show that, during boom periods, there is a heightened impact of 
all three “policy” shocks with the bank credit shock playing an important role. However, 
when they look at individual house price boom episodes, the cause of the price boom is not so 
clear. “…while on average it plays an important role, the bank credit shock is not important 
for the US house price boom of the 1990s and 2000s. (p.37)” Loose monetary policy and low 
inflation played some role, but the unexplained residual is the most important shock 
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explaining the US house price boom. The authors argue that the residual could be picking up 
other unspecified factors such as financial innovation and the shadow banking system. 
3. The Model 
3.1. Capital market arbitrage condition as a gravity pull 
A housing market, like any other market, is subject to arbitrage. From an investor’s point of 
view, a housing asset should generate the same rate of return as any other asset obtainable in 
the wider capital market, except for a difference in risk premium. This risk premium could 
reflect a liquidity risk, an operational risk or a risk of capital loss. Allowing for the fact that 
housing has a consumption value, individuals may be willing to pay a consumption premium 
which is over and above the price that can be justified purely from an investment point of view. 
The above arguments imply a variant of the usual asset market arbitrage condition that should 
hold in the long-run. Hence 
t
tttt
t
I
CRPE
P


 
1
][ 1         (1) 
where Pt = the price of one unit of housing asset at the beginning of period t; Rt = the imputed 
rent incurred at the end of period t; It = the time varying market required rate of return; and Ct 
= a composite variable capturing any other explanatory variables, such as credit constraint, risk 
premium and consumption premium. The coefficient  shows how Ct is related to Pt. To 
economize on notations, we will set  = 1 in the theoretical derivation. Define 
  tt Ii  1log ;        (2) 
hence 
     tttttt PCRPEi lnlog 1   .      (3) 
If the transversality condition,   0lim 
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pE , is satisfied, and if the imputed rent grows at 
a constant rate, it can be shown (see (Xiao and Huang, 2010)) that the fundamental house price 
satisfies: 
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where  
x=ln(X), and , , and  are functions of the underlying structural parameters and are time-
invariant under the constant growth assumption. As c includes the influence of credit 
constraints, relaxation of a binding constraint would have a positive impact on house prices. If 
expectations are adaptive/path-dependent (Nerlove, 1958, Feige, 1967)v, this fundamental 
price will be a function of the history of the variables involved in equation 4 – these might 
include the lagged values of imputed rent and mortgage advances. 
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3.2. The forces of speculation under uncertainty 
The path of house prices implied by the arbitrage condition would be observed at all times if 
housing markets were efficient in exploiting all available information. Empirical evidence 
shows that stock and bond markets are semi-strong efficient (Brennan and Schwartz, 1982, 
Pesando, 1978, Hotchkiss and Ronen, 2002, Fama, 1970, Fama et al., 1969, Fama and French, 
1988, Jaffe, 1974, Hall, 2001, Shiller, 1981), but real estate markets are different. Real estate 
assets are lumpy and are infrequently traded in private markets with high transaction costs. 
They are also location specific, requiring substantial local knowledge. This suggests that 
information inefficiency is an inherent feature of real estate markets. Furthermore, they can be 
subject to extensive intervention from local and national government, which creates an 
additional source of uncertainty in the form of legislative risk. As a result, real estate asset 
prices can deviate systematically from fundamentals for a prolonged period. This deviation can 
generate profit opportunities, hence inviting speculation (Case and Shiller, 1989, Guntermann 
and Norrbin, 1991, Maier and Herath, 2009, Beracha and Skiba, 2011, Xiao, 2010, Xiao and 
Huang, 2010).  
Consider a positive general productivity shock which leads to a boom in the real sector of the 
economy. Demand rises, supply adjusts to capture the profit opportunity created by the excess 
demand and firms hire more workers and seek more production space.  Wage rates rise in the 
labour market where firms compete to attract workers with the right amount of skills. The 
returns and values of commercial real estate assets increase with the rising demand for space. 
With inelastic supplyvi, house prices also climb up as more households can afford to own 
housing assets with income generated from their human and capital assets.  Productivity growth 
is thus translated into a housing market boom. 
In this changed and changing environment, it is hard for buyers and sellers of housing assets to 
assess their intrinsic value. The imputed rent might have changed and the housing asset 
premium might have shifted. Such information is not easily accessible by an average market 
participant. House prices at any given time are thus set by the flow demand and the flow supply, 
which only partly bear the signature of a rational calculation based on equation (4). Under the 
uncertainty, individuals may resort to momentum trading, creating a positive feedback effect. 
Furthermore, researchers indicate that emotion influences our decisions in many important 
matters (Ashkanasy and Humphrey, 2001, Ashkanasy, 2003, Fisher, 2008, Huy, 2012). 
Therefore, at any time, house prices may contain a bubble element tb . 
t
f
tt bpp           (5)  
3.3. Credit constraint as a transmission mechanism 
Suppose that borrower types are uniformly distributed between 0 and 1. Type-1 borrowers 
always repay the loan, while type-0s never do. A lender knows the distribution of borrower 
types, but cannot easily distinguish one from another. In order to minimize the risk of default, 
they set one of two constraints on every borrower: 
 tttt HPM  ,          (6) 
Or 
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 ttt YM           (7) 
whichever is lower. The Greek letter  denotes the loan-to-value ratio, with (0, 1), and the 
Greek letter  the income multiple, with  >1. Both  and  are set by the lender. The Roman 
letter M denotes the size of the mortgage a household can take out, Y its income, and H the 
household’s desired units of housing services, which is normalized to unity from now on to 
avoid cluttered notation.  
If neither of the constraints is binding, a household can borrow as much as it wishes at the 
going interest rate and the loan market would clear at the required rate of return. When one of 
the two constraints is binding, the amount of loan available is determined by either of the above 
two equations. Mathematically, 
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where f = function, StM = mortgage supply, and 
D
tM = mortgage demand. 
Mortgage supply may also be influenced by lender confidence on top of the mechanical rules 
set out above. We will gauge lender confidence with reference to mortgages in arrears in the 
empirical section. 
Equation 8 implies that if the constraint is not binding,  
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 is the elasticity of mortgage supply with respect to the interest rate. In 
this case, house prices and income will have no bearing on mortgage supply.  
If the income multiple constraint is binding, then  
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In this case a boom in the labor market will be transmitted into a boom in the housing market 
through the relaxation of the credit constraint in equation 4.  
If the collateral constraint is binding, then  
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In this case, a shock to the housing market will be transmitted to the credit market. By the same 
token, a bubble in the housing market will also spill over into the credit market.  
The theoretical derivations imply an empirical system of the following form: 
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The row vector xP consists of explanatory variables for house prices, and the row vector xM 
consists of explanatory variables for housing credit.  
It is possible that agents in the housing and/or mortgage market behave asymmetrically in 
different phases of a market cycle. The phase of a cycle can be captured by a latent state variable 
and the parameters of the above model are state-dependent. The exact state that the market is 
in is not observable, but the probability of the state can be estimated. In this case, the above 
system can be rewritten as 
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where st is a state variable following a first-order two-state Markov chain, with transition 
probabilities 
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where t  is the information set available at time t and ijq is the probability that state i  will be 
followed by state j given ,...,, 11 isis tt    and t . Equation 14 states that the probability 
distribution of 1ts  depends on past events alone through the value of ts
vii.  
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4. Empirical Analyses 
4.1. Data and methodology 
Our full sample consists of quarterly data for UK regional housing markets over the period 
1983Q1 - 2012Q1. We begin our analysis in the mid-1980s owing to data availability, but this 
also coincides with significant liberalization of the UK residential mortgage market. From 
1983Q1 to 2007Q4, house prices increased by 558.1 per cent in the UK as a whole and by 
683.5 per cent in Greater London (Halifax, all buyers, seasonally adjusted price). The market 
tumbled afterwards. By 2012Q1, house prices had dropped by 18.1 per cent in the UK and 12.4 
per cent within Greater London (see Figure 1). In order to assess its reliability given the price 
movements described above, the system set out in equations 13 and 14 is estimated using the 
subsample of data spanning 1983Q1 – 2007Q4. The parameters obtained are used then to assess 
the out-of-sample performance of the model during 2008Q1 – 2012Q1.  
Twelve geographical regions are covered in this study: North (N), Yorkshire & Humber (Y&H), 
North West (NW), East Midlands (EM), West Midlands (WM), East Anglia (EA), South West 
(SW), South East (SE), Greater London (GL), Wales (W), Scotland (S) and Northern Ireland 
(NI). The locations of these regions within the UK are shown in Figure 2. For comparison, a 
separate model is also estimated for UK average house prices. As the study period covers two 
known housing market cycles, we have a sample featuring multiple peaks and troughs with 
which to assess the accuracy of the estimated state transition probability as a predictor of actual 
turning points. 
INSERT FIGURES 1&2 ABOUT HERE 
INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
Table 1 displays variables included in the regression equations at the model selection stage. 
Halifax standardized regional house prices are used for Pviii. Ideally, regional level mortgage 
advances should be used in the empirical model, but the authors have no access to such data. 
Instead, national net mortgage advances are used as a proxy for regional M. Regional rental 
prices are also approximated by UK imputed rentals of owner-occupiers for the same reason. 
In the price equation, we include in the composite variable, C, the affordability of mortgages 
(mortgage rates), the influence of ownership (owner-occupied housing stock per person), and 
the impact of unemployment (regional claimant count rate). In the mortgage equation, we 
include mortgages in arrears as an additional explanatory variable. This variable may 
negatively impact lender confidence regarding the future state of affairs. It may also limit the 
capacity of lenders to issue new loans. 
In the regression, house prices were divided by gross disposable income per head. The result 
is a house price series that is independent of any income effect. This is henceforth referred to 
as the price-income multiple. Meanwhile, net mortgage advances and imputed rentals were 
divided by gross disposable income to create a mortgage-income ratio and a rental-income 
ratio, respectively. Finally, owner-occupied housing stock was divided by population to give 
stock-per-person. This process, on top of incorporating the influences of income and 
population, has the added advantage that differencing the time series, which is usually required 
to attain stationarity, became unnecessary. Important long-run information is thus retained and 
the extracted state probabilities are more likely to reflect the cyclical movements of the 
different regional markets. All the variables presented in Table 1 have passed Augmented 
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Dickey-Fuller (ADF) and Phillips and Perron (PP) unit root tests at the conventional 
significance levels.ix  
To reduce computation costs, the system equation models are pre-selected using no-switching 
three-stage-least-squares (3SLS). Variables are dropped one at a time when insignificant at the 
95 per cent level at this initial stage. Selected models are then re-estimated using Markov-
switching FGLS SUR. The FGLS estimator is appropriate when the disturbance term is 
heteroscedastic. The term SUR refers to the estimation method whereby the cross-equation 
covariance  is explicitly estimated and incorporated. The smoothed probability of the 
unobservable state variable ts  for a given sample of size T,  Tt is Pr , is inferred using 
discrete Kalman filter (Hamilton, 1994). In estimating  Tt is Pr , we assume that the DGP 
parameters, t
s are known, when in truth they need to be estimated. This can be achieved 
through maximizing the log likelihood function of the observed data using EM algorithm, as 
EM algorithm is efficient, simple and stable (Dellaert, 2002, Xiao and Tan, 2006). Simulations 
are used to establish the 99, 95 and 90 per cent confidence intervals for the parameter estimates, 
as the critical values for standard t-tests do not apply in this case (Hamilton, 1994, Horowitz, 
2001, Stoffer and Wall, 1991). The joint significance of the system of equations is tested using 
the Wald statistic. 
As part of the diagnostic checks, the estimated parameters are applied to observations between 
2008 Q1 and 2012 Q1. The model performed well in both in-sample fit and out-of-sample 
forecast. The excellent fit has been achieved in many cases as a result of including lagged 
dependent variables. There is, therefore, a strong positive feedback effect in both house prices 
and housing credit (see Table 3 and Figure 3 below). 
4.2. Parameter estimates, model evaluation, and discussion 
4.2.1. The mortgage market 
As explained earlier, UK net mortgage advances are used as a proxy for regional mortgage 
advances. As a result, the mortgage equation has the same explanatory variables with similar 
parameter estimates across different regions (Table 2). However, the estimates are not identical 
as the covariance structures between house prices and mortgage advances are heterogeneous 
across different regions. On the whole, the mortgage-income ratio is negatively and 
significantly affected by contemporaneous year-on-year changes in the mortgage rate.x It is 
also significantly and negatively affected by the contemporaneous value of the percentage of 
mortgages in arrears for 12 months or longer. Thus, after controlling for income, rising 
mortgage costs and increasing mortgage arrears deter lending activity through their effects on 
potential buyers and lenders. Interestingly, the impact of the second factor (arrears) is much 
larger than the impact of the first (mortgage rates).  
For instance, for the UK as a whole, a one-unit increase in the year-on-year change of mortgage 
rate reduces the ratio by 0.167 in state one (the state associated with the expansionary phase of 
the market) or by 0.352 in state two (associated with a contracting market). In contrast, this 
ratio would go down by 1.224 (in state one) or 1.766 (in state two) if the percentage of 
mortgages in arrears were to increase by one unit. The impact of average house prices on the 
mortgage-income ratio is significant and positive, as expected, but it is quite small in magnitude. 
For example, if the price-income multiple increases by one unit, the mortgage-income ratio 
would increase by merely 0.070 (in state one) or 0.079 (in state two). Finally, the lagged value 
of the mortgage-income ratio is an important factor; if the value of this ratio increased by one 
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unit in the previous quarter, its current value increases by 0.698 (in state one) or 0.713 (in state 
two). 
INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
It is obvious from Table 2 that the magnitude of impact of each explanatory variable varies not 
only across regions but also across different phases of a cycle. In a contracting market, as 
opposed to an expanding one, the supply of mortgages is more responsive to interest rate 
changes in all regional markets except for EM, WM, NW, SE and GL, and the dampening 
effect of mortgages in arrears on mortgage lending is far larger in all regions except for EM, 
WM, NW and GL. Thus, with the exception of the regional markets mentioned, our results 
suggest that lending activity is more sensitive to loan pricing and potential losses when the 
underlying collateral is deteriorating in value. Meanwhile, except for NW, GL and SE, the 
positive-feedback-effect represented by the lagged mortgage-income ratio is smaller in a 
contracting market, and, apart from NW and GL, the positive impact of price on mortgage 
advances is slightly larger. Thus lenders may become more cautious in following the lending 
momentum and slightly more aware of price movements when the housing market is collapsing. 
The above observations indicate that NW and GL have behaved consistently in the way 
mortgage supply responding to all market influences; EM and WM are consistent with each 
other in their mortgage supply response to interest rates and mortgages-in-arrears; SE, on the 
other hand, is consistent with NW and GL in the response to interest rates and price-income 
changes. EM and WM are right next to each other geographically, but NW is separated from 
GL and SE by EM and WM. Thus, geography has a role to play, but there is no simple 
geographical pattern with which to convey the entire story.  
4.2.2. The housing market 
The two most important effects on house prices are credit and positive-feedback effects. The 
results in Table 2 show that the impact of net mortgage advances on house prices (the credit 
effect) is typically positive, but varies significantly across different regions. The impact is very 
large (0.400 – 0.956) in the south (GL, SW, SE and EA), modest (0.290 – 0.368) in the middle 
part of the country (W, WM and EM), relatively small (0.099 – 0.256) in the north (Y&H, N, 
NW and S), and insignificant in Northern Ireland. The credit effect also varies across the two 
states. In all cases except GL and the SE, mortgage advances have a larger effect on house 
prices in an expansionary housing market. This finding concurs with Goodhart and Hofmann 
(2008), showing that the southern regions are likely to collapse quicker than the rest of the 
country in a tightened credit environment. For instance, the parameter estimates of mortgage-
income ratio (M(t)) for GL and EM are respectively 0.465 and 0.368 in state one, and 0.956 
and 0.329 in state two. 
Across both states, the positive feedback effect dominates the credit effect in all regional 
markets, with the exception of a contracting GL. The parameter estimates of the lagged price-
income multiple (which represents a positive-feedback effect) range from 0.840 to 1.086 in 
state one, and from 0.728 to 1.025 in state two. With the exception of GL, SE, and SW, the 
feedback effect is slightly smaller in an expanding market. As the positive feedback effect 
reflects price bubbles, this observation indicates that the southern regions are more prone to 
price bubbles than the rest of the country when the market is booming. 
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Three other factors appear to have some impact on the house price-income multiple in at least 
one of the twelve regions. First, the stock of owner-occupied housing per person has a large 
and positive impact across both states for GL and WM, and in one of the two states for SW. 
This suggests that housing ownership has a visible impact only in a very limited number of 
regional markets.  Second, the claimant count has a marginally significant negative effect at 
the 99 per cent level on the house price-income multiple in one of the two states in NI, but not 
in other regions. Third, the only region where house prices appear to have been directly 
negatively affected by interest rates is EA. This impact only appears to be important in 
expanding markets and is nearly negligible in a contracting market.  
The estimation results indicate that the UK housing market may be roughly divided into three 
major submarkets: one formed by SW, SE and GL (the southern submarket); one by W, WM, 
EM and EA (the middle submarket); and the final one by NW, Y&H, N and S (the northern 
submarket). This is consistent with the conclusions of previous researchers who find that the 
UK housing market is segmented along roughly the same lines (MacDonald and Taylor, 1993, 
Meen, 1999). Regions within the same submarkets exhibit similar price responses to the 
availability of national mortgage credit, as well as to their own past state. However, NI is a 
separate entity from the rest. For the price equation, it has a different set of explanatory 
variables and these variables are significant at the conventional levels only in one of the two 
states. The model is jointly significant for all regions as indicated by the Wald statistics (Table 
3). 
INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE 
4.2.3. The state of the UK regional housing markets 
The term “state” in the current context refers to the expansion or the contraction phase of a 
housing market cycle. Table 2 indicates that house price growth has a slight positive impact on 
credit expansion, that credit expansion produces further credit expansion, which has a large 
positive impact on house price growth, and that house price growth breeds further price growth. 
These rounds of price growth, except perhaps for the initial shock, can occur without any 
changes to fundamentals. Hence, a price bubble is more likely to form in a rising market and 
so the term “state” may refer to the bubble state of the market. The smoothed probabilities of 
the state are extracted using the discrete Kalman filter. If the estimated probability that the price 
is in state one,   11 1Pr itt qiss  , i = 1, 2, is greater than 0.5, we conclude that the housing 
market is more likely to be in a bubble state than not, and vice versa. Thus, they are interpreted 
as the estimated probabilities that the house price contains a bubble element (EPB).  
Bear in mind that 1iq  does not need to rise when prices rises, as the latter can do so for 
fundamental reasons as well. However, because of a strong feedback effect, a price bubble 
would grow with a rising price. Hence, 1iq should peak when the corresponding house price 
peaks and trough when the price troughs. When an estimated turning point misses the actual 
one by one, two, three, four or more quarters, it is marked with one, two, three or four asterisks 
correspondingly. Among the 12 regions, the estimates correctly predicted the turning points 
36.7% of the time, missed the turning points by one quarter 16.3% of the time, by two quarters 
10.2% of the time, by three quarters 8.2% of the time. That is to say that the estimates capture 
the turning points within +/- three quarters 71.4% of the time. The estimates indicate that most 
regions experienced two bubble periods between 1983Q2 and 2007Q4: one in the late 1980s 
and one in the years before the end of 2007 (Table 4 and Figure 4). 
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INSERT FIGURE 4 ABOUT HERE 
INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE 
The first expansion of the housing market within the sample period began in the southern 
submarket right at the start of the period (1983Q2). This was followed two years later by EA, 
and three years later by the rest of the middle submarket and by the NW region. Expansion in 
Y&H and N did not begin until 1987Q1 and 1988Q1, respectively. The expansion ended first 
in the southern submarket and EA in 1988Q4. WM followed suit in 1989Q1, the EM and W 
regions in 1989Q2, and N, NW and Y&H in 1989Q4. Neither S nor NI was caught in this cycle 
according to our results. 
The second expansion started in GL in 1995Q4. This was followed by SE in 1996Q2, EA in 
1998Q2, and SW in 1999Q2. S joined this expansion in 2000Q1 and N in 2000Q4. EM, WM, 
NW and Y&H were relative latecomers, beginning expansion in 2001Q1. W then joined in 
2001Q4 and NI eventually jumped on to the bandwagon in 2003Q1. The sign of a downturn 
appeared as early as 2007Q1 in NW, SW and W, and in N and NI one quarter later. By 2007Q3, 
most of the remaining regional markets also started turning down. Only two markets, S and 
WM, seemed unyielding to the downward pressure by the end of the estimation sample 
(2007Q4).  
If we are to compare regional prices with the UK national average, the expansion / contraction 
pattern reflected in the latter would fail to pick up the rich topography of regional house price 
movements that our analysis has indicated. This shows the danger of relying on a single 
national indicator for gauging the state of the housing market in the United Kingdom and, more 
broadly, the need for housing market analyses to be aware of potential regional differences.  
5. Conclusion 
The current study attempts to establish important contributing factors to the rapid ascent of UK 
housing wealth prior to 2007 and the ensuing economic hardship. A priori, a growth in national 
disposable income (the income effect), a shifting of wealth from other asset markets into 
housing (the portfolio effect), an influx of foreign money (the open-market effect) and an 
expansion of domestic housing credit (the credit effect) could have all played some part in that 
drama. To examine all of these effects, one needs an all-inclusive general equilibrium 
framework, as argued by Goodhart and Hofmann (2008). In the current study, we construct a 
partial equilibrium model focusing on the last factor – the expansion of domestic credit.  
It is generally believed that a malfunctioning credit market was the culprit for the housing 
bubble prior to the 2007-8 financial crisis and is primarily responsible for the crisis itself. This 
study attempted to identify the extent to which the housing loan market could be held 
responsible. We chose to examine this question in the UK rather than in the USA or other 
countries because of the pronounced price movements in the UK over this period and the 
availability of high quality data. To date, most studies on the price-credit nexus focus on the 
national housing market. Meen (1999), in his quest to examine a ripple effect in prices, noticed 
that there are significant regional differences in the way house price growth reacted to 
economic conditions. Thus, we study this issue by looking at regional housing markets instead.  
An analytical framework incorporating a bubble transmission mechanism between housing and 
credit markets was first set up. The model was then estimated using historical data for the 
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period 1983Q1 to 2007Q4. Geographical differences were examined using regional house 
prices and structural shifts were allowed for by applying a Markov-switching technique to 
differentiate between expanding and contracting markets. Both in-sample and out-of-sample 
data (2008Q1 – 2012Q1) fit very well within the model.  
The theoretical model suggests that credit constraints act as a propagation mechanism, 
transmitting shocks occurring in the labour and/or housing market to the mortgage market.  Yet 
our results for UK regional housing markets suggest that the loan-to-value ratio does not appear 
to be an important explanatory variable. The empirical outcomes show that the price-income 
multiple is significant, but has a rather small explanatory power for net mortgage advances, 
while the variable representing unemployment is not usually significant at all. Thus, credit 
constraints appear to have limited power in transmitting shocks in the labour and housing 
markets to the mortgage market. The variable which has the largest impact on lending activity 
is mortgages-in-arrears. The large coefficient on this variable may primarily reflect lender 
confidence rather than lending capacity constraint, as total mortgages in arrears reached only 
3.5 per cent at its previous peak in 1992 and 1.4 per cent at its recent peak in 2009xi.  
We further found that, in a falling (as opposed to a rising) market and in most regions, both 
interest-rates and mortgages-in-arrears have a larger negative effect and the price-income 
multiple has a slightly larger positive impact on mortgage lending, but the momentum effect 
of lending drops slightly. The larger dampening effect of mortgage in arrears is particularly 
destabilising in a declining market given its size. This asymmetric response may reflect pro-
cyclical lending practices of banks, as predicted by Goodhart et al. (2004), and institutional 
constraints faced by lenders. The larger negative impact of interest rates in a down market 
suggests that monetary policy can be more potent in such a market, which is of interest for 
policymaking. However, the supply of mortgages in some regions (e.g. EM, WM, NW, GL and 
SE) does not always respond to economic and market influences in the same way as in other 
regions. Thus, a policy or regulatory measure designed to help the market may have differential 
effects across different regions and the aggregate outcome may not be as anticipated. 
The theoretical model suggests that rent is one of the most important drivers of house prices. 
Empirically, imputed rent failed to show any significant impact on the price. Interest rates 
reflecting the discount factor also failed to have any direct impact on prices in the majority of 
regional markets. Nevertheless, it has an indirect impact via the credit effect. Instead, house 
prices are shown to be primarily driven by a positive-feedback effect and a credit effect. 
Furthermore, the feedback effect is far more important that the credit effect. Thus, alone, 
irresponsible lending in the housing credit market could not have created one of the biggest 
housing bubbles in the known economic history of the United Kingdom.  
We contribute to the literature theoretically by explicitly modeling credit constraint as a bubble 
transmission mechanism that is based on market opportunities rather than utility optimization. 
We also contribute to the literature empirically by examining regional differences across the 
United Kingdom as well as variations in different phases of market cycles in these regions. We 
discovered that the estimates of the state probabilities have the potential to serve as a marker 
for dating housing market cycles, a barometer for measuring the evolution of housing bubbles, 
and a predictor of market turning points. Future work may seek to establish a general 
equilibrium model capturing all four effects discussed earlier in this section, and improve upon 
our results by employing regional explanatory variables.  
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Table 1 - Variables Examined During Regression Analysis 
All data are sourced from DataStream, except for the Halifax standardised regional house 
prices, these being obtained from the website for Lloyds Banking Group. All variables in the 
table were included in the regression equations at the model selection stage. Variables were 
dropped from the analysis if they were statistically insignificant at the 95 per cent level. (t) 
indicates a contemporary value and (t-1) a lagged value. 
Explained 
variables 
Halifax standardised regional house price 
/UK gross disposable income per head 
UK mortgage net advances/UK gross 
disposable income 
Explanatory 
Variables 
UK mortgage net advances/UK gross disposable 
income (M(t)) 
YOY change of UK mortgage rate (%) 
(I(t)) 
UK Imputed rentals of owner-occupiers/UK 
gross disposable income (R(t)) 
UK mortgages 12 months or more in 
arrears (%) (A(t)) 
YOY change of UK mortgage rate (%) (I(t)) UK median mortgage percent advance 
(LTV(t)) 
UK owner–occupied housing stock 
(Vol)/Population (O(t)) 
UK house price/UK gross disposable 
income per head (UK_P(t)) 
YOY change in regional claimant count rate (%) 
(C(t)) 
Lagged UK mortgage net advances/UK 
gross disposable income (M(t-1)) 
Lagged regional house price/UK gross 
disposable income per head (P(t-1)) 
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Table 2: Parameter Estimates (Sample 1983Q1 – 2007Q4) 
Parameters, along with the covariance matrices, are estimated using iterative FGLS, with 
confidence intervals (C.I.) established using Bootstrap simulation with 1000 replications. If an 
estimate falls outside the 90, 95 or 99 per cent C.I., it is marked with a * or ** or *** 
respectively. For instance, the coefficient of the lagged price/income ratio of East Anglia falls 
outside the 99 percent C.I., which implies that the probability that the true parameter takes the 
value of 0.843 is less than 1 per cent. 
East Anglia (EA) Price Mortgage 
State one M(t) P(t-1) I(t) I(t) A(t) UK_P(t) M(t-1) 
 0.644** 0.843*** -0.225 -0.343 -1.722 0.079 0.711 
State two M(t) P(t-1) I(t) I(t) A(t) UK_P(t) M(t-1) 
 0.400 0.943 -0.016 -0.505 -3.699 0.110 0.601 
East Midlands (EM) Price Mortgage 
State one M(t) O(t) P(t-1) I(t) A(t) UK_P(T
) 
M(t-1) 
 0.368 6.259* 0.840 -0.347 -1.698 0.076 0.725 
State two M(t) O(t) P(t-1) I(t) A(t) UK_P(T
) 
M(t-1) 
 0.329 -3.238* 0.976** -0.177 -1.330 0.078 0.669 
Greater London (GL) Price Mortgage 
State one M(t) O(t) P(t-1) I(t) A(t) UK_P(t) M(t-1) 
 0.465 5.637 0.914 -0.356 -1.751 0.077 0.719 
State two M(t) O(t) P(t-1) I(t) A(t) UK_P(t) M(t-1) 
 0.956 17.530 0.736 -0.091* -0.964 0.058 0.745 
North (N) Price Mortgage 
State one M(t) P(t-1) I(t) A(t) UK_P(t) M(t-1) 
 0.284* 0.935 -0.133 -1.211 0.063 0.746 
State two M(t) P(t-1) I(t) A(t) UK_P(t) M(t-1) 
 0.109 0.965 -0.341 -1.737 0.078 0.718 
Northern Ireland (NI) Price Mortgage 
State one C P(t-1) I(t) A(t) UK_P(t) M(t-1) 
 -0.172*** 1.086*** -0.240 -1.261 0.051 0.822 
State two C P(t-1) I(t) A(t) UK_P(t) M(t-1) 
 -0.004** 0.998** -0.348 -1.725 0.076 0.722 
North West (NW) Price Mortgage 
State one M(t) P(t-1) I(t) A(t) UK_P(t) M(t-1) 
 0.235* 0.942 -0.332 -1.690 0.076 0.722 
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State two M(t) P(t-1) I(t) A(t) UK_P(t) M(t-1) 
 0.107*** 0.967*** -0.155 -1.481 0.067 0.760 
Scotland (S) Price Mortgage 
State one M(t) P(t-1) I(t) A(t) UK_P(t) M(t-1) 
 0.257*** 0.949** -0.310 -1.538 0.063 0.782 
State two M(t) P(t-1) I(t) A(t) UK_P(t) M(t-1) 
 0.099 0.972 -0.344 -1.726 0.077 0.717 
South East (SE) Price Mortgage 
State one M(t) O(t) P(t-1) I(t) A(t) UK_P(t) M(t-1) 
 0.603 -16.232** 1.002 -0.356 -1.713 0.075 0.726 
State two M(t) O(t) P(t-1) I(t) A(t) UK_P(t) M(t-1) 
 0.839 18.952* 0.728 -0.108 -2.940 0.102 0.627 
South West (SW) Price Mortgage 
State one M(t) O(t) P(t-1) I(t) A(t) UK_P(t) M(t-
1) 
 0.749 -11.720*** 0.930* -0.165 -0.923 0.064 0.687 
State two M(t) O(t) P(t-1) I(t) A(t) UK_P(t) M(t-
1) 
 0.664 10.472 0.777 -0.359 -1.769 0.078 0.715 
Wales (W) Price Mortgage 
State one M(t) P(t-1) I(t) A(t) UK_P(t) M(t-
1) 
 0.331 0.933 -0.209 -1.291 0.056 0.797 
State two M(t) P(t-1) I(t) A(t) UK_P(t) M(t-
1) 
 0.165 0.951 -0.354 -1.748 0.078 0.717 
West Midlands (WM) Price Mortgage 
State one M(t) O(t) P(t-1) I(t) A(t) UK_P(t) M(t-
1) 
 0.317 5.660 0.872 -0.346 -1.678 0.074 0.730 
State two M(t) O(t) P(t-1) I(t) A(t) UK_P(t) M(t-
1) 
 0.290 -6.540* 1.025** -0.198 -1.480 0.089 0.618 
Yorkshire & Humber 
(Y&H) 
Price Mortgage 
State one M (t) P (t-1) I(t) A(t) UK_P(t) M(t-
1) 
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 0.221 0.955 -0.179 -1.239 0.057 0.785 
State two M (t) P (t-1) I(t) A(t) UK_P(t) M(t-
1) 
 0.117 0.962 -0.350 -1.742 0.077 0.719 
All UK Price Mortgage 
State one M(t) O(t) UK_P(t-1) I(t) A(t) UK_P(t) M(t-
1) 
 0.256 -0.948 0.965* -0.167 -1.224 0.070 0.698 
State two M(t) O(t) UK_P(t-1) I(t) A(t) UK_P(t) M(t-
1) 
 0.362 6.089 0.865 -0.352 -1.766 0.079 0.713 
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Table 3: Diagnostics for Regression Models 
In-sample (1983Q1 – 2007Q4) and out-of-sample (2008Q1 – 2012Q1). 
Region In-sample Fit Out-of-sample Fit 
 R2 Adj R2 Wald 
statistic 
State 1 R2 State 1 
Adj R2 
State 2 R2 State 2 
Adj R2 
EA 0.997 0.996 195.79 0.959 0.949 0.984 0.979 
EM 0.996 0.996 216.28 0.977 0.971 0.983 0.978 
GL 0.999 0.998 205.34 0.992 0.990 0.960 0.949 
N 0.996 0.996 219.07 0.981 0.976 0.979 0.974 
NI 0.994 0.993 204.38 0.945 0.933 0.971 0.965 
NW 0.997 0.997 227.85 0.982 0.978 0.986 0.983 
S 0.997 0.997 224.68 0.986 0.982 0.983 0.979 
SE 0.998 0.998 202.11 0.982 0.978 0.966 0.956 
SW 0.997 0.997 220.26 0.960 0.949 0.966 0.957 
W 0.996 0.996 223.29 0.984 0.981 0.981 0.977 
WM 0.996 0.996 218.39 0.986 0.982 0.985 0.982 
Y&H 0.997 0.996 205.55 0.986 0.983 0.981 0.977 
UK 0.998 0.998 213.25 0.991 0.988 0.985 0.981 
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Table 4 Cycles and Bubbles in UK Regional Housing Markets (c.f. Figure 6) 
If the estimated probabilities that the explained variable is in state one,   11 1Pr itt qiss  , 
i = 1, 2, is greater than 0.5, we conclude that the housing market is more likely to be in a 
bubble state than not, and vice versa. Note that 1iq  need not to rise when the price rises as it 
may do so for fundamental reasons. However, if accurate, 1iq should peak when the 
corresponding house price peaks and trough when the price troughs.  When an estimate 
misses the corresponding observed turning point by one, two, three, four or more quarters, it 
is marked with one, two, three, or four asterisks correspondingly. Refer to figure 4 for cross-
verification. 
 
Region Bubble period 
(Prob(st =1) > 0.5) 
Observed and estimated phases of cycles 
 Observed Estimated 
EA 1983Q2 - 1984Q4 Contract 1983Q2 – 1985Q2 1983Q2 – 1988Q4**** 
1989Q2 - 1992Q2 Expand 1985Q2 – 1988Q4 1988Q4 – 1989Q2** 
2002Q1 - 2007Q4 Contract 1988Q4 – 1998Q2 1989Q2 – 1998Q1* 
 Expand 1998Q2 – 2007Q3 1998Q1 – 2007Q4* 
  
EM 1983Q2 - 1987Q2 Contract 1983Q2 – 1986Q2 1983Q2 – 1988Q4**** 
1989Q3 - 1999Q3 Expand 1986Q2 – 1989Q2 1988Q4 – 1990Q1*** 
2001Q4 - 2007Q4 Contract 1989Q2 – 2001Q1 1990Q1 – 2001Q1 
 Expand 2001Q1 – 2007Q3 2001Q1 – 2007Q4* 
  
GL 1983Q2 - 1989Q1 Expand 1983Q2 – 1988Q4 1983Q2 – 1988Q4 
1996Q3 - 2007Q4 Contract 1988Q4 – 1995Q4 1988Q4 – 1992Q2**** 
 Expand 1995Q4 – 2007Q3 1992Q2 – 2007Q3 
 Contract 2007Q3 – 2007Q4 2007Q3 – 2007Q4 
  
N 1988Q4 - 1989Q4 Contract 1983Q2 – 1988Q1 1983Q2 – 1988Q1 
2002Q3 - 2005Q3 Expand 1988Q1 – 1989Q4 1988Q1 – 1989Q2** 
 Contract 1989Q4 – 2000Q4 1989Q2 – 2001Q1* 
 Expand 2000Q4 – 2007Q2 2001Q1 – 2004Q3**** 
 Contract 2007Q2 – 2007Q4 2004Q3 – 2007Q4 
  
NI 2004Q3 - 2007Q2 Contract 1983Q2 – 2003Q1 1983Q2 – 2003Q1 
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Region Bubble period 
(Prob(st =1) > 0.5) 
Observed and estimated phases of cycles 
 Observed Estimated 
 Expand 2003Q1 – 2007Q2 2003Q1 – 2007Q2 
 Contract 2007Q2 – 2007Q4 2007Q2 – 2007Q4 
  
NW 1983Q2 - 1984Q1 Contract 1983Q2 - 1986Q2 1983Q2 – 1986Q3* 
1989Q3 - 2007Q4 Expand 1986Q2 - 1989Q4 1986Q3 – 1989Q2** 
 Contract 1989Q4 - 2001Q1 1989Q2 – 1996Q3**** 
 Expand 2001Q1 - 2007Q1 1996Q3 – 2007Q4*** 
 Contract 2007Q1 – 2007Q4 **** 
  
S 2004Q2 – 2007Q1 Contract 1983Q2 – 2001Q1 1983Q2 – 2004Q1**** 
 Expand 2001Q1 – 2007Q4 2004Q1 – 2007Q1*** 
 Contract  2007Q1 – 2007Q4**** 
  
SE 1983Q2 - 1989Q1 Expand 1983Q2 – 1988Q4 1983Q2 – 1989Q1* 
2004Q4 - 2007Q4 Contract 1988Q4 – 1996Q2 1989Q1 – 2001Q4**** 
 Expand 1996Q2 – 2007Q3 2001Q4 – 2007Q4* 
 Contract 2007Q3 – 2007Q4 **** 
    
SW 1984Q4 - 1990Q1 Expand 1983Q2 – 1988Q4 1983Q2 – 1989Q1* 
2003Q4 - 2007Q1 Contract 1988Q4 – 1999Q2 1989Q1 – 2000Q2**** 
 Expand 1999Q2 – 2007Q1 2000Q2 – 2007Q1 
 Contract 2007Q1 -2007Q4 2007Q1 – 2007Q4 
  
W 1988Q2 -1989Q2 Contract 1983Q2 – 1986Q2 1983Q2 – 1986Q2 
2002Q4 - 2004Q3 Expand 1986Q2 – 1989Q2 1986Q2 – 1988Q4** 
2006Q4 - 2007Q1 Contract 1989Q2 – 2001Q4 1988Q4 – 2001Q4 
 Expand 2001Q4 – 2007Q1 2001Q4 – 2007Q1 
 Contract 2007Q1 -2007Q4 2007Q1 – 2007Q4 
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Region Bubble period 
(Prob(st =1) > 0.5) 
Observed and estimated phases of cycles 
 Observed Estimated 
WM 1989Q2 - 1986Q2 Contract 1983Q2 – 1986Q2 1983Q2 – 1988Q3**** 
1989Q2 - 2007Q4 Expand 1986Q2 – 1989Q1 1988Q3 – 1990Q1**** 
 Contract 1989Q1 – 2001Q1 1991Q4 – 2001Q1 
 Expand 2001Q1 – 2007Q4 2001Q1 – 2007Q4 
  
Y&H 1988Q3 - 1989Q3 Contract 1983Q2 – 1987Q1 1983Q2 – 1987Q1 
2002Q1 - 2005Q4 Expand 1987Q1 – 1989Q4 1987Q1 – 1989Q2** 
 Contract 1989Q4 – 2001Q1 1989Q2 – 2000Q2*** 
 Expand 2001Q1 – 2007Q3 2000Q2 – 2004Q4**** 
 Contract 2007Q3 – 2007Q4 2004Q4 – 2007Q4 
  
UK 1986Q2 - 1989Q2 Expand 1983Q2 – 1989Q1 1983Q2 – 1989Q1 
2006Q4 - 2007Q1 Contract 1989Q1 – 2001Q1 1989Q1 – 1992Q1**** 
 Expand 2001Q1 – 2007Q3 1992Q1 – 2007Q1** 
 Contract 2007Q3 – 2007Q4 2007Q1 – 2007Q4 
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Figure 1: Trends in Key Economic Variables 
(a) House prices and the house price-income multiple: UK standardised prices 
 
Source: Halifax House Price Index, Lloyds Banking Group 
 
(b) Trends in lending, inflation and economic growth 
 
Source: Datastream  
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Figure 2: UK Statistical Regions as at 31st December 2011 
 
Map reproduced under the OS Open Data agreement: Contains Ordnance Survey data © Crown 
copyright and database right 2013. The shaded areas denote regions of England while Scotland, Wales 
and Northern Ireland are separate countries within the United Kingdom. Boundary changes mean that 
there are some differences between North and North West used in the paper and North East and North 
West as shown on the map. Similarly, there are some differences between East Anglia and South East 
used in the paper and East of England and South East as shown on the map.  
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Figure 3: Out-of-sample Fit (2008Q1 – 2012Q1) 
Price refers to price-income multiple, and mortgage to mortgage-income ratio (c.f. Table 1). 
Phat_i (Mhat_i) = prediction made using state i parameter estimates, i = 1, 2.  
 
(a) East Anglia (b) East Midlands 
  
(c) Greater London (d) North 
  
(e) Northern Ireland (f) North West 
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(g) Scotland (h) South East 
  
(i) South West (j) Wales 
  
(k) West Midlands (l) Yorkshire & Humberside 
  
(m) All UK 
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Figure 4: House Price–Income Ratios and Estimated Probabilities of Bubble 
Price refers to price-income multiple and is scaled down in proportion for fitting purposes. 
SMp1 refers to the smoothed probability that the price contains a bubble element. 
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(g) Scotland (h) South East 
  
(i) South West (j) Wales 
  
(k) West Midlands (l) Yorkshire & Humberside 
  
(m) All UK 
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i The Retail Price Index was the primary measure of general price inflation in the UK prior to the introduction of 
a Consumer Price Index. 
ii The dwelling stock is monitored by the UK Department for Communities and Local Government - see 
www.gov.uk/government/statistical-data-sets/live-tables-on-dwelling-stock-including-vacants (last accessed in 
January 2016).  
iii For example, see the minutes of the UK Monetary Policy Committee meetings (April 2001). 
iv The rise in house prices may even persist in the long-run in places where housing supply is constrained by 
land or regulation (Goodhart and Hofmann, 2008). 
v Institutionalists argue that individuals or organizations are path dependent – they apply their accustomed 
solutions to new problems whether or not these can be expected to work (see MARCH, J. G. 1988. Decisions 
and organizations, New York, NY, Blackwell.) This observation is closely related to the notion of adaptive 
expectations in economic theory (see references in the text). 
vi The annual increase in the UK dwelling stock has been below 1 per cent between 1983 and 2007. This 
inelasticity in supply in the UK is largely driven by regulatory constraints (BARKER, K. 2004. Review of 
Housing Supply. Available: http://image.guardian.co.uk/sys-files/Guardian/documents/2004/03/17/Barker.pdf . 
vii Refer to Hamilton (1994) page 691 for discussion of this specification. 
viii See www.lloydsbankinggroup.com/media1/economic_insight/halifax_house_price_index_page.asp (last 
accessed 11 October 2013) 
ix The complete files containing all test statistics are not included as tables, owing to their size, but can be 
obtained from the authors on request. 
x There is one exception, South East in the contracting phase of a cycle. As this exception is less than 5 per cent 
of the twenty-four parameters estimated, we regard it as a statistical outlier. 
xi See https://www.gov.uk/government/statistical-data-sets/live-tables-on-repossession-activity  Table 1300. 
                                                 
